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Abstract  The characteristics of Maimonides’ thought, works, and career can 
be understood in the context of the new social and intellectual challenges that me-
dieval Jewish communities in the Mediterranean basin had to face during the twelfth 
century. The disintegration of traditional Jewish culture in Andalusia, a new type of 
Islamic polemic against Judaism, and the decrease of rabbinic authority all contri-
buted to Maimonides’ conviction that Judaism was experiencing a profound crisis in 
his time. Much of Maimonides’ oeuvre can be seen as a series of attempts to 
overcome this crisis. Adopting the Aristotelian concept of mental language, 
Maimonides attempted to establish a new culture of reading traditional Jewish texts. 
Adopting philosophical theories of good life, he proposed a new ideal for the future 
Jewish religious leadership. 
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Eight hundred years ago, on 13 December 1204, one of the greatest personalities of 
human history passed away.1 Virtually all of his Jewish contemporaries in the Islamic 
world immediately recognized the importance of this loss. The text for the reading of 
the haphtarah was changed in many synagogues to the first chapter of the book of 
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1  The first version of this paper was read on 13 December 2004 at the conference of the 
Magyar Hebraisztikai Társaság commemorating the 800th anniversary of Maimonides’ 
death. I would like to express my gratitude to the audience of this conference for their 
most relevant comments on the topics and especially to Gyöngyi Hegedűs and Gábor 
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Joshua, which starts with the sentence “And after the death of Moses, the servant of 
God…” Needless to say, these words were meant to evoke the memory of the great 
deceased, Moses Maimonides. 
 The anniversary of Maimonides’ death is a good occasion to rethink his mani-
fold contribution to human civilization in a broad perspective. Such an investigation 
can at least partly answer the question of how this man achieved such a high reputa-
tion among his contemporaries – one that endures to this day. 
 In the following paragraphs I will select some of the aspects of his life and 
works that are not properly understood, in my opinion, by present-day scholarship. In 
other words, my intention here is to challenge “the common wisdom” of present-day 
Maimonidean scholarship on a number of questions. 
The Date of Maimonides’ Birth 
Shlomo Dov Goitein proved, on the basis of Maimonides’ commentary on the 
Mishnah, that Maimonides was born in 1138 rather than in 1135. It makes no sense to 
question the authenticity of the document or the correctness of Goitein’s inter-
pretation; we can take it as a fact that Maimonides was indeed born in 1138 as far as 
medievalists can take anything as a fact. In the cases of many other medieval perso-
nalities, the accepted dates are based on much weaker evidence than that brought 
forward by Goitein.2 
 In spite of that, the date 1135, accepted in earlier scholarship, stubbornly re-
appears in recent publications including the latest editions of the Encyclopaedia 
Judaica. This practice should be abandoned; 1135 is simply the wrong date, whereas 
1138 is the correct one. 
Maimonides’ Cultural Background 
It is often taken for granted that Maimonides was one of the last representatives of the 
so-called “Golden Age” of Spanish-Jewish culture. A simple consideration can 
demonstrate that the situation is far more complicated. The greatest representatives of 
the “Golden Age,” such as Solomon Ibn Gabirol, Bahya Ibn Paquda, Judah ha-Levi, 
Moses Ibn Ezra, and Abraham Ibn Ezra, were all great and famous poets; many of 
them were excellent philosophers, but none of them contributed anything significant 
to Talmudic studies. 
 Poetry played an eminent role in the social life, culture, and education of Jewish 
intellectuals in eleventh-century and early twelfth-century Muslim Spain. This was 
partly due to the influence of Muslim courtly culture on the elite of Jewish society and 
partly due to theological and spiritual considerations. Jews serving at the courts of 
Muslim emirs could hardly avoid partaking in the culture of the ruling elite at least to 
some degree. Moreover, Muslim theologians of the age referred to the poetic beauty 
of the Koran and the Arabic language in general as proofs for the divine origin of 
Islam. For those Jews whose mother tongue was Arabic and were educated according 
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Biography in Light of Genizah Documents,” in Hommage à Georges Vajda, ed. Gérard 
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to the norms of the courtly culture, these claims must have sounded extremely 
persuasive. “Don’t you see with your own eyes,” they might ask themselves, “how 
beautiful the poems of the Arabs are?” To develop poetry of similar quality in 
Hebrew (and also theories about biblical poetry and Hebrew as the primordial 
language) was the only efficient way of sustaining and defending the Jewish faith of 
these people. The competition between Judaism and Islam was enacted as a 
competition between Hebrew and Arabic language and poetry. Hebrew poetry in 
Muslim Spain was not just a matter of pleasure and artistic taste. It was also a means 
of restating and reviving Jewish identity. 
On the other hand, the Talmudic heritage of Judaism could play only a limited 
role in defending Judaism. The Talmud was a key element of the rabbinic identity as 
opposed to the Karaite dissidents. However, Karaism was never particularly strong in 
Spain. Consequently, there were hardly any significant Talmud scholars in Spain 
during the period except Rabbi Yitzhak al-Fasi, himself a refugee from Fez, Morocco, 
and Ibn Migash, his student, who became a “spiritual grandfather” of Maimonides. 
The “Golden Age” of Spanish-Jewish culture was definitely not a golden age of 
Talmudic studies.3 
Maimonides himself hardly wrote a single line of poetry, but was one of the 
greatest giants in Talmudic scholarship in any age.4 This fact shows that his educa-
tion and socialization probably followed different patterns than that of Judah ha-
Levi or Abraham Ibn Ezra. Moreover, as I will argue later, outside the borders of 
Spain an important change took place in Maimonides’ philosophical approach in the 
years following the completion of his commentary on the Mishnah (1168). The 
Maimonides of Mishneh Torah (cc. 1180) and The Guide of the Perplexed (cc. 
1190) was not the same personality as the young man who left Spain or Provence 
with his family around 1159. 
Spanish Jewry in Crisis: The End of the Golden Age 
Some of the classical writers of the Golden Age themselves recognized that their 
culture was about to meet new intellectual and social challenges arising from the 
Muslim and Christian environment. Judaism in Spain became less resistant to Muslim 
and Christian propaganda than it had been before. A certain Samuel, an important 
member of the community in Fez, converted to Christianity in Toledo in 1085 and 
addressed an epistle in Judeo-Arabic to no less a personality than the aforementioned 
                                               
3  On the low level of Talmudic education in Spain see Ephraim Kanarfogel: Jewish 
Education and Society in the High Middle Ages (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1992), 64–65; Mordecai Breuer: “Le-heqer ha-tipologiya shel yeshivot ha-maarav bimei 
ha-beinayim” (On the typology of the western yeshivot in the Middle Ages), in Studies in 
Jewish Society in the Medieval and Early Modern Periods Presented to Jacob Katz on his 
75th Birthday, ed. E. Etkes and Y. Salmon (Jerusalem: Magness Press, 1980),  45–48. 
4 As far as I know, Maimonides’ only contribution to Hebrew poetry is a couple of lines at 
the very beginning and end of his The Guide of the Perplexed. These short verses consist 
of verbatim quotations from the Bible. Cf. the appendix in the second volume of Michael 
Schwartz’s Hebrew translation of the Guide: More nevukhim le-rabbenu Moshe ben 
Maymon (Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed: Hebrew translation and commentary), tr. 
Michael Schwartz (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 2002).  
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Rabbi Yitzhak al-Fasi (known also as Rif) arguing vehemently that the exile of Israel 
would not be over until all the Jews followed his example.5 The apostasy of the great 
philosopher, Abu-l-Barakat al-Baghdadi6 and Yitzhak Ibn Ezra, the son of Abraham 
Ibn Ezra must have been an even greater shock and scandal. The young Ibn Ezra was 
no less talented in poetry and philosophy than his famous father. He followed Abu-l-
Barakat al-Baghdadi, his master in philosophy, to Baghdad, where they traveled in 
order to meet Muslim philosophers from the school of Avicenna. In Baghdad both of 
them converted to Islam. We do not know why; however, it is quite probable that the 
new type of philosophical learning they acquired was instrumental in their decision. 
Hebrew poetry and old fashioned speculations about the “mysteries” of the Hebrew 
language could no longer defend Jewish identity from the new intellectual weapons of 
the Muslims: Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy. It is possible that the character 
of “the philosopher” appearing in the first pages of Judah ha-Levi’s Cuzari was partly 
inspired by Abu-l-Barakat and Yitzhak Ibn Ezra.7 
The challenge also had a spiritual aspect. A very significant eleventh-century 
Muslim writer’s sentences on friendship document the moral decline of the political 
elite in the decades following the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate in 1031.8 Solo-
                                               
5  The Judeo-Arabic original is no longer extant, as far as I know. It was translated into 
Latin by  Iacobus Bonhomius OP in 1339 in Paris. The Latin text is edited in Patrologia  
Latina 149: 333–368. However, it seems to me that a manuscript in Florence, BML, Plut. 
III, 7 contains better text than the one printed in the Patrologia. This manuscript identifies 
the author as “Rabbi Samuel Israelita ordinis de civitate Fethet Regis Marrochietani” and 
the addressee as “Rabbi Isaac magistrum Synagogae qui est in sublimi Regno predicto” – 
from this description it is obvious that the addressee could hardly be anyone else than 
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Maria Biscioni: Bibliothecae Ebraicae Graecae Florentinae, sive Bibliotheca Mediceo-
Laurentianae Catalogus (Florence: Ex Imperiali Typographio, 1757), 111–113. Note that 
this text was very popular in the Middle Ages and some scholars believe it is a forgery. 
See Ora Limor, “The Epistle of Rabbi Samuel of Morocco: A Best-Seller in the World of 
Polemics” in Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemics Between Christians and 
Jews, ed. Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa (Tübingen; J. C. B. Mohr, 1996), 177-194.  
6  On this person see Colette Sirat: A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 131–140. 
7  The chronology of the events is not clear. It is usually assumed that Abraham Ibn Ezra 
left Spain in 1140 after having heard of his son’s apostasy (which thus must have taken 
place before 1140). However, Yitzhak Ibn Ezra wrote a laudatory poem about his master, 
Abu-l-Barakat on the occasion of the latter’s finishing a biblical commentary (on 
Ecclesiastes) in 1143. Some scholars infer from this fact that the apostasy of both master 
and student must have taken place after 1143. On the basis of geniza-documents, Goitein 
argues that Yitzhak Ibn Ezra was actually the son-in-law of Judah ha-Levi, and they 
traveled together from Spain to Egypt in 1140. Cf. Shlomo Dov Goitein: A Mediterranean 
Society, vol. 2 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1971), 
302–303. Judah ha-Levi wrote the Cuzari circa 1138–1140 
8  Ibn Hazm (994-1064): Al-akhlāq wa-l-siyar (Morals and behavior), 120–154; esp. 125, 
129, and 134–137. English translation: In Pursuit of Virtue: The Moral Theology and 
Psychology of Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi, tr. M. Abu Laylah (n. p.: TA-HA Publishers, 1990). 
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mon Ibn Gabirol, the greatest Hebrew poet of the mid-eleventh century, refused to 
follow the practice of his colleagues, namely, to serve a rich and powerful Jewish 
family or individual as a “courtly poet.” Ibn Gabirol chose poverty and freedom; he 
was highly critical of the leaders of the Jewish community and in his philosophical 
opus magnum he developed a private spirituality having no specific reference to any 
Jewish sources. 
 It is possible to see in Ibn Gabirol only an idiosyncratic (“arrogant” or “non-
conformist”) individual. However, later developments show that other Jewish intel-
lectuals were not content with the moral and religious conduct of Spanish Jewry 
either. Bahya Ibn Paquda attempted to revitalize Jewish spiritual life by adopting 
certain elements from Sufi mysticism. Judah ha-Levi in the Cusari, besides defending 
the Jewish faith, also criticized his Jewish contemporaries and urged them to take 
religion more seriously. Ironically enough, he pointed to the martyrs of Christianity as 
positive counter-examples of the negligence of his coreligionists: 
 
[The Khazari:] Christians do not glory in their kings, heroes, and rich people, 
but in those who followed Jesus all the time, before his faith had taken firm root, 
who were expelled or who hid themselves or were killed wherever one of them 
was found, suffering dreadful humiliations and slaughter for the victory of their 
belief: these men they regard as worthy of conferring blessing; they revere the 
places where they lived and died, and they build churches in their names. In the 
same way, the supporters of the founder of Islam bore many humiliations, until 
they succeeded; but in these their humiliations and martyrdom they glory – not 
in the princes who excelled by wealth and power; no, in those who were clad in 
rags and fed scantily on barley. Yet, O Rabbi, they lived so in utmost solitude 
and devotion to God. Should I see the Jews acting in a like manner for God’s 
sake, I would place them above the kings of David’s house, for I am well aware 
of what thou didst teach me concerning the words ‘(I am) with the contrite and 
humble spirit’ (Jes. 57: 15), viz. that the light of God enters only into the souls 
of the humble. 
[IV. 23] The Rabbi: Thou art right to blame us: our degradation has not yielded 
any result! […]9 
 
 By the time Judah ha-Levi wrote these lines, Sunnite Islam had elaborated a 
new paradigm that synthesized religious law, traditional scholarship, the latest de-
velopments in philosophy, and Sufi mysticism into a coherent unity. Abu Hamid al-
Ghazzali (d. 1111) showed in an encyclopedic summary how the observance of the 
traditional laws of Islam leads to a spiritually rich life. The title of the work, Ihyā’ 
ulūm ad-dīn, “The Revitalization of Religious Sciences,” speaks for itself. This book 
                                               
9  Judah ha-Levi: Cuzari IV. 22–23; tr. Isaak Heinemann in Three Jewish Philosophers, 
ed. Hans Lewy, Alexander Altmann, and Isaak Heinemann (New York: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1965), 120. The continuation of the quotation is one of the most beautiful and 
famous passages of the Cuzari: the rabbi compares Israel to a seed thrown to field, where 
it apparently disappears among earth, water and dung. However, the case is the opposite, 
earth, water, and dung will be transformed into the plant growing from the seed. This is 
how Judaism transforms the life of other people – Christians and Muslims – although 
apparently it is rejected by the later religions. Now the plant bears a fruit – this is the 
Messiah – in which the seed will reappear in its original form (Cuzari IV. 23). 
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was to become an important source of inspiration and model for Maimonides in 
writing his Mishneh Torah. In another work (Tahāfut al-falāsifa, “The Incoherence of 
Philosophers”) Ghazzali defined and defended Islamic orthodoxy against the 
doctrines of Arab Aristotelians. In his Munqidh min al-dalāl, “Delivery from Error,” 
Ghazzali described his own spiritual development and argued for the orthodoxy of 
Sufism. Maimonides’ Dalālat al-hā’irīn (“The Guide of the Perplexed”) can be read 
partly as a reply to Ghazzali’s criticism of philosophers and partly as a Jewish 
adaptation of some of his arguments. It is possible that the title itself was also inspired 
by Ghazzali’s Munqidh. 
 Ghazzali’s ideas inspired a new religious movement in North Africa. The so-
called Muwahhidūn (“those who confess the unity of God”), better known as Almo-
hads, introduced religious reforms to implement the ideals of the new spirituality in 
the territories where they gained control. In their eyes, social reality had to conform to 
the prescriptions of the holy texts rather than the texts be interpreted in accordance 
with social reality. This resulted in a new wave of religious intolerance and led to the 
formation of a “persecuting society.” The ten-year old Maimonides and his family 
(together with many other Jews and Christians) had to leave Cordoba in 1148 due to 
the Almohad reforms after conquering the city. 
 To sum up, Jewish intellectuals in the middle of the twelfth century had to face 
a many-faceted crisis. From an intellectual point of view, Muslim philosophers could 
offer new methods and theories to explain the broad structure of reality. Hebrew 
poetry, philology, biblical exegesis, and mysticism as practiced by previous 
generations could not compete with them any longer. From a spiritual point of view, 
both Muslims and Christians offered attractive alternatives to those Jews who were 
disappointed with the corrupt social life of the political elite. From a social point of 
view a new type of intolerance and persecution threatened the Jewish communities of 
Muslim Spain. 
 The crisis ended the Golden Age of Spanish Jewry. Cultural life changed 
dramatically in order to avoid the disintegration of rabbinic Judaism. Two great 
personalities – Judah ha-Levi and Abraham Ibn Ezra – left the country when Mai-
monides was about two years old. Judah ha-Levi’s Cuzari and Ibn Ezra’s scientific 
and exegetic works written in the Christian West were the last homage to the old 
culture. Judah ha-Levi emphasized the importance and the value of the Talmud in 
Jewish spirituality, but he was unable to create a synthesis comparable to 
Ghazzali’s concerning religious law – although the Cuzari could compete in every 
respect with Ghazzali’s apologetic writings. Judah ha-Levi was probably a late 
beginner in Talmudic scholarship at the best lacked the necessary educational 
background for advanced studies. From this point of view, Maimonides was from a 
different planet. 
Maimonides’ Education: The Talmud 
The fact that elderly Yitzhak al-Fasi succeeded in creating a school of Talmudic 
studies in the late eleventh century evidences the growing interest of Spanish Jews in 
the laws of their ancestors. The reason for this was probably the emerging need for 
spiritual renewal – besides the personality of the master, Yitzhak al-Fasi. He 
composed an epitome of the Talmud that facilitated its study and its popularization. It 
probably served as a basic textbook in the young Maimonides’ education as well – in 
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his old age he wrote with unconditional respect about “the Rav of blessed memory’s” 
compendium.10 
 Al-Fasi’s most important disciple in Spain was Joseph Ibn Migash, who also 
attracted a number of students – the father of Maimonides among them – and wrote 
important commentaries on the Talmud. Maimonides’ principal teacher was his own 
father, who transmitted to him the tradition of the Al-Fasi school. His rabbinic edu-
cation was by no means superficial, but rooted in the tradition of excellent scholars of 
three previous generations. 
 Thus, unlike Judah ha-Levi, Abraham Ibn Ezra, and many others, the young 
Maimonides not only felt the necessity for a spiritual return to the Oral Torah, but 
also had the intellectual means to use rabbinic sources extensively in an original and 
creative way for addressing both theoretical and practical problems. Diligence in 
Talmudic studies was the first corner stone of Maimonides’ religious culture. This 
statement might seem self-evident for the modern reader. However, it is a rather 
surprising fact considering what has been written supra about the cultural milieu of 
early twelfth-century Spain. Maimonides might have been the last great representative 
of the Golden Age, but he was definitely not typical. 
 It is possible that R. Maymun ben Joseph, the father of Maimonides, and other 
pupils of Ibn Migash were critical of the life-style and intellectual orientation of the 
classical representatives of the Golden Age, and that by studying the Talmud they 
wanted to create a sort of counter-culture against the dominant trends. This hypothesis 
could account for the remarkable nonconformism of the mature Maimonides as well. 
However, I am not presently aware of any clear proof of this. 
Maimonides’ Education: Astrology and the School of Ibn Bajja  
“Astrology was the first science I learned” – confesses Maimonides in his Letter on 
Astrology, a work of old age.11 This fact shows well the persistence of the old educa-
tional paradigm. Astrology was intimately connected to neo-Platonic metaphysics and 
mysticism. For example, Abraham Ibn Ezra perceived Judaism as a mystery religion 
offering salvation from astrological fate. Besides astrology Maimonides probably also 
studied philosophical and mystical texts inspired by neo-Platonic thought, such as the 
Sefer Yetsira, the Shiur Qoma and their recent commentaries. He probably shared the 
mystical outlook of these texts in his youth. In this respect Maimonides’ educational 
background was no different from that of Abraham Ibn Ezra and many other 
contemporaries. 
 We have to reckon with a new factor, however, already in this early period. In 
the Guide he mentions the fact that he studied astronomy together with the Muslim 
disciples of Ibn Bajja.12 We do not know whether the young Averroes (born also in 
Cordoba ten years before Maimonides) was also among them as a student or in-
structor. In any case, it is certain that both Averroes’ and Maimonides’ version of 
Aristotelianism is very much indebted to the school founded by Ibn Bajja (d. 1138) in 
Muslim Spain. As a contrast we can refer to Maimonides’ older contemporary and 
                                               
10  Mose ben Maimon [Maimonides]: Epistulae, ed. D. H. Baneth (Jerusalem, 1946), 68. 
11  Cf. Isadore Twersky (ed.): A Maimonides Reader (New York: Behrman House, Inc., 
1972), 463–473. 
12  GP II, 9; tr. Pines, 268–269. 
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compatriot, Ibrahim Ibn Daud (Abraham ben David), whose Aristotelian philosophy 
follows the footsteps of Avicenna’s school. 
 Ibn Bajja’s fame was due to his ability to interpret Abu Nasr al-Farabi’s 
works. According to a contemporary source practically no one was able to 
understand philosophical texts in the Muslim West before the publication of Ibn 
Bajja’s comments on Farabi’s logical works and other subjects.13 The ideas of 
Avicenna – the most influential Aristotelian writer in the period – were often 
criticized by the members of Ibn Bajja’s circle. They thought that Avicenna had 
corrupted Aristotle’s original teachings and pointed to Farabi as the authentic 
interpreter of Aristotle. Strong respect for Farabi’s philosophical writing was also a 
characteristic of the mature Maimonides. 
Mental Language 
Aristotelian logic and the Aristotelian idea of science can be considered the 
second corner-stone of Maimonides’ religious culture. Aristotle as interpreted in 
Ibn Bajja’s school taught Maimonides how to reorganize Talmudic law and 
Jewish theology. The last chapter of one of his first writings, the Treatise on 
Logic (written around 1158 in Christian Spain or in Provence), can be read as a 
philosophical manifesto.14 Following the footsteps of Farabi, the young 
Maimonides declares the existence of mental language (an-nutq ad-dakhīl – inner 
speech) the grammar of which is Aristotelian logic. External languages such as 
Hebrew or Arabic are subordinated to the universal mental language. In order to 
understand a sentence, one has to be able to translate it – so to speak – from the 
natural to the mental language. The later is the true language of knowledge and 
the sciences. Maimonides outlines the Aristotelian system of sciences and 
emphasizes the role of logic as their “organon.”15 
 As far as we know today, Maimonides was the first Jewish writer who wrote 
about Aristotelian logic. Ibn Daud and Abraham Ibn Ezra certainly read Avicenna 
and used his metaphysical ideas; however, neither of them proclaimed the priority 
of mental language and a strictly Aristotelian system of sciences. On the contrary, 
the idea of Hebrew as the primordial and perfect language whose mysteries teach 
philosophical and theological doctrines is central in Ibn Ezra’s thought. The 
young Maimonides’ ideas concerning the priority of the mental language over any 
natural languages (including Biblical Hebrew) started a completely new approach 
not only in philosophy but also in biblical exegesis and Talmudic scholarship.  
                                               
13  Cf. Muhammad Saghir Hasan al-Ma‘sumi: “Ibn Bājjah,” in M. M. Sharif (ed.): A 
History of Muslim Philosophy (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), 509. The quotation 
is from Ibn al-Imam, a disciple of Ibn Bajja. 
14  Herbert Davidson has recently questioned the authenticity of this work; cf. his Moses 
Maimonides: The Man and His Works, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 313–322. 
Davidson’s arguments are very strong, though his opinion has not been  universally 
accepted yet. If Davidson is right, the analysis proposed above demands fundamental 
revision. 
15  Cf. Maïmonide [Maimonides]: Traité de logique, ed. and tr. Rémi Brague (Paris: 
Desclée de Brouwer, 1996), 94–103 [Arabic part: 30-34].    
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Systematizing Halakha 
In the mature Maimonides’ vision, Talmudic law (halakha) forms a coherent and 
meaningful unity. To decide a halakhic problem correctly is not simply a matter of 
interpreting the relevant Talmudic discussions (sugyot). One has to see the inner 
structure of the entire halakhic system. You cannot understand properly the halakhot 
concerning Shabbat if you are not familiar with the laws of the Sanctuary or of Levitic 
purity. The great halakhic works of Maimonides, the commentary on the Mishnah 
(completed in 1168 in Egypt), the Book of Commandments, and the Mishneh Torah 
(completed around 1180) all attempt to exhibit the entire corpus of Jewish religious 
law as an interconnected and well-organized system. Talmudic exegesis is not a 
matter of ingenious interpretation of certain loci in the text, but of discovering the 
intellectual structure on which all the particular halakhot are dependent. 
 In other words, the real Talmud is written in Aristotelian mental language. How-
ever, it is covered by a great number of confusing statements expressed in natural 
languages (Rabbinic Hebrew and Aramaic). The task of the interpreter is to remove 
the veil of the natural languages and to disclose the coherent message of the Oral 
Torah written in the mental language. 
 Consequently, the interpreter has to find those ways of expression in natural 
languages that hide the structure of the mental language to a lesser extent. For ex-
ample, commenting on the Mishnah offers a better opportunity to understand the 
entirety of Jewish law than a commentary on the Babylonian Talmud or other texts. 
A summary of the Torah in 613 commandments provides the reader with an overall 
vision of what halakha is about, whereas a series of complicated analyses 
concerning the possible implications of certain Talmudic sugyot will fail to do so. 
The genre best fitting Maimonides’ intentions was found, or rather invented, only 
when he started to compose the Mishneh Torah. Thus, Maimonides in his major 
halakhic works proclaimed and realized a fresh, innovative, and provoking program 
in Talmudic studies. 
Criticizing the Yeshivot 
Maimonides was able to diagnose the roots of the spiritual decline of rabbinic Ju-
daism: The Talmud was not studied properly in contemporary yeshivot. Professors 
and students wasted their energies on exegetical investigations of local textual 
problems instead of trying to understand halakha as a system. The result was a com-
plicated and verbose literature treating irrelevant questions and false problems. This 
practice was to be blamed for the unpopularity of Talmudic studies. Once the living 
source of Jewish spirituality – the Torah itself – did not find its way to contemporary 
people it was no great wonder that a dramatic decline was experienced in almost 
every aspect of Jewish life. 
 Maimonides went a step further. The reason for the improper methodology of 
Talmudic education lay in the fact that the institutions responsible for education – the 
yeshivot – did not function in the spirit of the Talmud either. The great yeshiva in 
Baghdad and its leader, the gaon, used Talmudic education as a pretext for collecting 
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taxes from the people and exercising power over them. That example was followed in 
many other countries including Spain.16 
 Furthermore, once the Talmud became a source of income for certain social 
groups they were interested in monopolizing Talmudic studies. They developed an 
overcomplicated version of Talmudic methodology difficult for most people to grasp. 
Moreover, the yeshivot were ruled by an authoritarian spirit; promotion was not 
dependent on the students’ intellectual and spiritual progress but on their family 
background or on their readiness to serve the interests of powerful persons. 
 All this was contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the Talmud according to 
Maimonides. The Talmudic rabbis taught everybody for free. They earned their 
livelihood from their own civil professions. They explicitly forbade accepting money 
for teaching the Torah (Mishnah, Avot 4: 5). Commenting on this passage 
Maimonides sharply criticizes the geonim who: 
 
fixed for themselves monetary demands from individuals and communities and 
caused people to think, in utter foolishness, that it is obligatory and proper that 
they should help sages and scholars and people studying Torah […] all this is 
wrong. There is not a single word, either in the Torah or in the sayings of the 
[talmudic] sages, to lend credence to it […] for as we look into the sayings of 
the talmudic sages, we do not find that they ask people for money, nor did they 
collect money for the honorable and cherished academies.17 
Mishneh Torah as Social Action: Strategy and Influence 
Maimonides’ response to the situation was simple and witty. The root of the spiritual 
decay was the monopolization of Talmudic studies. Consequently, Talmudic scho-
larship should be de-monopolized. This was the mission of his ambitious halakhic 
summary: the Mishneh Torah. The purpose of the book, as he himself states in the 
introduction, was to enable the reader to learn and understand the entirety of Jewish 
religious law without consulting any other book – not even the Talmud. In a letter to 
his beloved pupil, Joseph ben Judah (not Judah Ibn Aknin), he explains that the 
intention of the Mishneh Torah was to liberate people from the necessity of consulting 
difficult Talmudic commentaries (al-perushin u-ferushe ta‘qīdāt al-gemara). In the 
same letter he also expressed his hope that future generations would consult the 
Mishneh Torah solely, except for that minority who preferred to trouble themselves 
with useless studies and irrelevant problems – the allusion is probably to the Talmudic 
methodology of the yeshivot.18 
                                               
16  A good introduction to the history of the gaonate is Robert Brody’s The Geonim of 
Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1998), esp. 19–82. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, vol. 2, 1–20 and 
195–205 is also very illuminating though less exact in details. 
17  English translation is taken from Hillel H. Ben-Sasson, “Maimonidean Controversy,” in 
Encyclopaedia Judaica, Corrected edition, vol. 11 (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 
1996 [cc. 1972–1974]): 745–746.  
18  Mose ben Maimon [Maimonides]: Epistulae, ed. D. H. Baneth (Jerusalem, 1946), 52 
and 68-69. A good English translation: Rayond L. Weiss and Charles E. Butterworth: 
Ethical Writings of Maimonides (New York: Dover Publications, 1975), 113–123. 
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 The liberating effect of the Mishneh Torah was already being felt in 
Maimonides’ lifetime. Due to the relatively high rate of literacy among the Jews in 
the Islamic countries and the spread of paper, a new and cheap writing-material, 
Maimonides could address an independent and wide public.19 In the aforementioned 
letter, he describes how Samuel ben Ali, the gaon of Baghdad, became more and 
more frustrated by the fact that Maimonides’ book was becoming popular in 
Baghdad.20 Seemingly, the gaon had no means to influence the spread of the 
Mishneh Torah. 
 In a letter written around 1200, Sheshet b. Isaac of Saragosa reports the opposi-
tion of local rabbis to judging according to the Mishneh Torah. Sheshet b. Isaac notes 
that the opposition is motivated by the fact that, thanks to Maimonides’ code, people 
are less dependent on rabbinical authority – they are able to understand the law by 
themselves. Before the copies of the Mishneh Torah reached Spain people had no 
choice but to obey the rabbis since the vast majority were ignorant of the Talmud.21 
 A book can change social reality. Mishneh Torah was an ingenious assault on 
the power of the traditional rabbinic elite.22 
Conflict with the Gaon of Baghdad 
Due to the spread and influence of his great halakhic works Maimonides became 
more than simply an internationally known scholar. He became the symbol of a new 
mentality. Letters asking for halakhic instruction came to him from many countries, 
often addressing him as gadol ba-dor, “the greatest of the generation.” Earning his 
livelihood as a physician rather than as a teacher of the Torah, Maimonides himself 
became the prototype of the spiritual leaders whom he depicted when he contrasted 
the Talmudic rabbis with the corrupted practice of the geonim. 
 These developments aroused the anger of traditional leaders, first and foremost 
Samuel ben Ali, the gaon of Baghdad. He and his son-in-law, Zechariah ben 
Berakhel, openly criticized Maimonides’ halakhic decisions and even questioned his 
orthodoxy on the question of resurrection. Maimonides defended his position in both 
halakhic and theological matters but tried to avoid escalating the conflict. 
 However, in a letter to his favorite pupil, Joseph ben Judah, written in Cairo 
around 1191, he depicted his opponents in an openly sarcastic way: 
 
How could my son not know that such moral habits would be found in someone 
brought up from his childhood to believe that no one like him exists in his gen-
eration? Moreover, he has been encouraged [in that belief] by his old age, 
standing, ancestry, and by the absence of discerning men in that area. His need 
                                               
19  Cf. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, vol. 1, 81 and vol. 2, 171–185; Colette Sirat: Du 
scribe au livre: Les manuscrits hébraux au moyen age (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1994), 69–72. 
20  Maimonides, Epistulae, ed. Baneth, 55. 
21  Cf. Alexander Marx: “Texts by and about Maimonides,” Jewish Quarterly Review 25 
(1934/35): 371–428; esp. 427–428.  
22  For a further elaboration of this point and more detailed analysis of the relevant sources 
see my “Maimonides és a bagdadi gáon” (Maimonides and the gaon of Baghdad), in 
Széfer Jószéf: Essays in Honor of Joseph Schweitzer, ed. József Zsengellér (Budapest: 
Open Art, 2002), 161–199. 
188 Visi, T.: Maimonides’ Intellectual Portrait 
of the people is such that he implants in their souls the abominable concoction 
that all of the people should seek to know about every matter coming from the 
judicial academy23 or every honorific title it confers – besides those foolish 
things that naturally occur to them. How could my son imagine that he would 
reach such a level of recognition of the truth that he would admit his incompe-
tence and uproot his honor as well as the honor of his father’s house?24 
 
 These words can be read as Maimonides’ diagnosis of the reasons for the moral 
decline of Jewish leadership. In the verdict on the gaon’s son-in-law, Zechariah ben 
Berakhel, the Talmudic methodology of the geonim is Maimonides’ target: 
 
As for this Master Zechariah, he is a very foolish man. He has studied by him-
self and toiled over those investigations and commentaries. He supposes himself 
to be unique in his time and to have already reached the highest perfection. <My 
esteemed son knows, by the living God, that my evaluation of the great wise 
men of Israel is based on my determining the rank they deserve according to 
their own words. It was they who said: “The work of Abayya and Rabba is a 
small thing.”25 If this is a small thing in my sight, >26 why should I pay attention 
to a truly miserable old man, who is ignorant of everything and whom I view 
indeed as an infant one day old?27 Still, he is forgiven due to his ignorance.28 
 
 At the same time, Maimonides urged his disciple to avoid direct confrontation 
with the gaon and his supporters. He advised him that the significance of the conflict 
should not be overestimated. The envy of contemporaries would not survive the 
present generation, whereas the Mishneh Torah would be read again and again in the 
future.29 Maimonides was right: these persons – no matter how powerful they were in 
the late twelfth-century – are but footnotes in Maimonides’ biography today. 
 It is remarkable how conscious Maimonides was of the future reception of his 
book. He probably had enough historical information at his disposal about the fate of 
previous writers and their books – for example, Solomon Ibn Gabirol a century before 
– to form an analogous statement about his own case. His expectations concerning the 
would-be success of the Mishneh Torah determined his strategy in the conflict with 
the gaon. The gaon and his son-in-law would not be taken seriously in the future, so 
why should they be taken seriously in the present? Maimonides was developing long-
term strategies, and thus he tried to minimize confrontation with the gaon. 
                                               
23  I.e. the yeshiva in Baghdad. 
24  Tr. Rayond L. Weiss and Charles E. Butterworth, Ethical Writings of Maimonides, 116-
117. Italics are in the original. The italicized part of the last sentence is a quotation from the 
Babylonian Talmud (Horayot 14a). Arabic text: Maimonides, Epistulae, ed. Baneth, 54. 
25  Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 28a.  “The work [perhaps “argumentations” would be a 
better translation] of Abayya and Rabba”  refer to the notoriously complicated discussions 
of these Talmudic rabbis that are often considered to be the peak of Talmudic dialectics. 
26  This passage is attested only in the so-called “Neofiti” [Hebrew] translation of the text. See 
on this Baneth’s introduction to his edition of the text: Maimonides, Epistulae, 31–49; 56. 
27  Italiced words are taken from Babylonian Talmud, Sota 22a. 
28  Tr. Rayond L. Weiss and Charles E. Butterworth, Ethical Writings of Maimonides, 117-
118. Italics are in the original. Arabic text: Maimonides, Epistulae, ed. Baneth, 56. 
29  Maimonides, Epistulae, ed. Baneth, 52. 
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A Jewish Saint Francis of Assisi? 
In the same letter, Maimonides authorized Joseph ben Judah to open a school (mi-
drash) in Baghdad to promote the study of the Mishneh Torah. At the same time, he 
admonished his beloved student not to accept any form of payment for his teaching 
activity but to finance the school from the incomes he earned as a merchant and phy-
sician: “So far as I am concerned, one dirhem as a wage for tailoring, carpentry, or 
weaving is preferable to the [tax] income [reshut]30 of the Exilarch.”31 
 Studying the Torah should be consistently separated from the political and 
economic realm. Taxes collected by the exilarch of Babylonia – whose authority 
Maimonides fully accepted and codified in the Mishneh Torah and who probably 
supported Joseph ben Judah’s attempts in Baghdad – should not be used for the 
purposes of the planned school. 
 This insistence on the independence of the spiritual realm resembles the evan-
gelic movements in the contemporary Latin West. Maimonides’ program of returning 
to the ideal lifestyle of the Talmudic rabbis is analogous, to a degree, with the 
Christian idea of evangelic poverty – although poverty in itself is usually not counted 
as a virtue in Jewish sources. It is possible that Maimonides was actually influenced 
by Christian spirituals in his youth when his family was wandering in Christian Spain 
and possibly also in Provence. It is more convenient, however, to analyze the 
phenomenon in a larger context. 
 Adherents of scriptural religions facing complex social, economical, political, 
and intellectual problems are likely to look for the answers in their holy books and to 
announce a program of returning to the “original” ideals formulated by the sacred 
texts. As long as they find a medium with which to get their message to the public and 
as long as the public is able to understand them, charismatic individuals can exercise 
tremendous influence on their society even if they have very little social or political 
power. The twelfth century produced the prerequisites of this mechanism: the spread 
of literacy, the emergence of an educated public, and a sufficient number of 
economic, social, and political crises. The career of a Ghazzali or a Maimonides, or 
an Abelard or a Saint Francis of Assisi a bit later, can be characterized by this pattern. 
They were all non-conformists believing strongly that reality should be adjusted to the 
message of authoritative texts rather than that the texts be interpreted in accordance 
with reality. 
 Moreover, their activity prepared the way for the emergence of “persecuting 
societies,”32 attempting to enforce their ideas on those segments of the society that 
were not necessarily persuaded by them or interested in them – Maimonides being no 
exception to this. A couple of decades after his death Maimonides’ followers issued 
bans against anyone who dared to criticize the Master’s person or teaching. It is 
possible to see in the “Maimonidean controversies” of the 1230s and 1300s a Jewish 
                                               
30  On the meaning of this word see Simha Assaf: “Qovets shel iggerot R. Shmuel ben Ali 
u-vnei doro” (A collection of letters by R. Samuel ben Ali and his contemporaries), Tarbiz 
1 (1929): 102–130; esp. 117–120; Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia, 39, 59, and 72-73. 
31  Tr. Rayond L. Weiss and Charles E. Butterworth, Ethical Writings of Maimonides, 122. 
Arabic text: Maimonides, Epistulae, ed. Baneth, 68. 
32  On this concept see R. I. Moore’s influential book: The Formation of a Persecuting 
Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 
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analogue of what scholars call “persecuting society” in the context of Western 
Christian civilization.33 
Maimonides on Shiur Qoma: A Change of Episteme? 
In the commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides enumerates the Shiur Qoma, a 
classic of early Jewish mysticism in the holy literature of Judaism.34 However, in a 
precious Oxford manuscript (Bodleian, MS Pococke 295 [Neubauer 404]) – that was 
in all likelihood Maimonides’ personal copy of the commentary on the Mishnah and 
served as the master copy for further manuscripts35 – the sentence concerning Shiur 
Qoma is crossed out with a “bold stroke of deletion.”36 
 This is not surprising in itself. Maimonides happily admitted that he revised his 
halakhic decisions a number of times and changed the text of his previous works 
accordingly.37 With the Shiur Qoma, however, the situation is more complicated. In a 
responsum written many decades after completing the Mishnah-commentary, 
Maimonides denies the fact that he ever considered the Shiur Qoma authentic: 
 
I never thought that it was one of the works of the Sages of blessed memory 
[Talmudic rabbis], and far be it from them that this [book] should have come 
from them. It is but a work of one of the Byzantine preachers, and nothing else. 
Altogether, it is a great mitsva to delete this book and to eradicate the mention 
of its subject matter; “and make no mention of the name of other gods” (Exodus 
23: 13), etc., since he who has a body [qomā] undoubtedly is [to be classed 
among] “other gods.”38  
                                               
33  The best introduction to the history of the Maimonidean controversies is Hillel H. Ben-
Sasson’s article in the Encyclopaedia Judaica, vol. 11, 745–754. 
34  Introduction to the commentary on Pereq Heleq of tractate Sanhedrin: “The circle 
would have to be extended to include a discourse on the forms which the prophets 
mentioned in connection with the Creator and the angels; into this enters the Shiur Qoma 
and its subject matter. For [a treatment of] this subject alone, even if shortened to the 
utmost degree, a hundred pages would be insufficient…” English translation is quoted 
from Alexander Altmann, “Moses Narboni’s ‘Epistle on Shi‘ur Qomā,’” in Jewish 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 231. 
35  On the concept of the “personal copy” see Colette Sirat: Du scribe au livre: Les 
manuscrits hébraux au moyen age (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1994), 54–59.  
36  Cf. Alexander Altmann, “Moses Narboni’s ‘Epistle on Shi‘ur Qomā,’” in Jewish 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 225–280; the relevant discussion is on pages 231–232. A 
facsimile edition of the manuscript: Solomon D. Sassoon (ed.), Maimonidis Commentarius 
in Mischnam (Copenhagen: E. Munksgaard, 1956). Most of the medieval manuscripts do 
not contain the passage about Shiur Qoma; however, four further manuscripts do contain it 
– their ancestors were probably copied from MS Pococke 295 before Maimonides deleted 
the sentence. 
37  Cf. Maimonides, Epistulae, ed. Baneth, 50-51. Cf. also Sirat, Du scribe au livre, 54. 
38  Tr. Alexander Altmann, “Moses Narboni’s Epistle…” 231–232. Arabic original: 
Maimonides: Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. Joshua Blau,  vol. 1. (Jerusalem: Mekize 
Nirdamim, 1957), 200–201 [nr. 117]. 
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 Despite Maimonides’ claim, the Oxford manuscript of the commentary on the 
Mishnah clearly testifies that Maimonides did accept the authenticity of Shiur Qoma, 
at least at the time when he composed the commentary (1168). However, 
Maimonides’ later estimation of this mystic text was so different that he was appar-
ently even unable to admit the fact that he had ever considered it worthy of reading. 
This is very unusual in Maimonides’ oeuvre. 
 I will argue below that Maimonides’ changing evaluation of the Shiur Qoma 
signified a profound change in his overall philosophical approach. 
 Besides the Aristotelian philosophy of Ibn Bajja’s school, the young Maimo-
nides probably also read Jewish and/or non-Jewish philosophical works inspired by 
the neo-Platonic tradition. Sefer Yetsira was commented on by a number of presti-
gious Jewish authors in the neo-Platonic spirit. The Shiur Qoma was interpreted 
similarly by Maimonides’ elder contemporary, Abraham Ibn Ezra (see next section). 
The Treatise on Logic evidences the young Maimonides’ attraction to numerology, 
which is not surprising if we suppose that he was instructed in neo-Platonic philoso-
phy.39 This educational background accounts for the young Maimonides’ appreciation 
of the Shiur Qoma. 
 It is my hypothesis that Maimonides’ shift to a more strictly Aristotelian posi-
tion in philosophy did not take place before he completed the commentary on the 
Mishnah. By the time Maimonides wrote his responsum condemning the Shiur 
Qoma he was even unable to take seriously numerological speculations concerning 
divine names and other phenomena of Jewish neo-Platonism. This was not simply 
changing his position in some specific philosophical problem. Between the accep-
tance and the condemnation of the Shiur Qoma Maimonides moved to a different 
philosophical galaxy. 
 Analyzing Peter Lombard’s theological and Gratian’s juridical works, Alain 
Boureau applied Michel Foucault’s concept of episteme to model the emergence of 
scholastic thought in the twelfth century. According to Boureau, Peter Lombard and 
Gratian invented new ways of formulating and solving problems. They described the 
many-faceted phenomena of reality by the application of “veridical fictions” substi-
tuting for the phenomena themselves. As a result they were able to propose coherent 
theories with a degree of subtlety unprecedented in previous scholarship.40 
 Perhaps a similar change of episteme took place in Maimonides’ life as well. In 
his youth he might have applied “mysterious objects” (numbers, Plotinian universals; 
see the next section) to understand the ultimate structure of reality as did his older 
contemporaries, first and foremost, Abraham Ibn Ezra. However, as a mature 
philosopher he applied the principles of Aristotelian logic more consistently; he 
rejected “mysterious objects” and adopted “veridical fictions” instead, similar to Peter 
Lombard’s and Gratian’s practice.  
                                               
39  Cf. Brague’s introduction to his edition of the work: Traité de logique, 12–13. 
40  Alain Boureau, “Droit et Théologie au XIIIe siècle,” Annales 47 (1992): 1113–1125. I 
am grateful to Piroska Nagy for calling my attention to this article. 
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Abraham Ibn Ezra on Shiur Qoma: Plotinian Universals 
In the Long Version of Ibn Ezra’s commentary on Exodus 33: 21 we find brief re-
marks concerning the Shiur Qoma that highlight – in my opinion – the type of phi-
losophy that Maimonides rejected after composing his commentary on the Mishnah: 
 
And behold, Moses turned into a universal. That is why God said, ‘I know you 
by name’ (Exodus  33:12). For He alone knows the individuals and their parts in 
a universal way. 
Now the noblest on earth is man – hence the form of the cherubim. And the 
noblest among men is Israel – hence the issue of the [divine] phylactery. 
And that is why it is written in the Shiur Qoma, “God is the Creator of all the 
bodies and all that are nobler than the bodies.” And what is more debased than 
body is the accident. 
And ‘Rabbi Ishmael said, whoever knows the measure [shiur] of the Former 
of Creation [yotser bereshit] it is guaranteed to him that he belongs to the 
world to come, and I and Rabbi Akiva are giving our words for this.’ And this 
is [the meaning of] ‘Let us make man according to our image and likeness’ 
(Genesis 1: 26).41 
 
 These words might sound quite enigmatic to the modern reader, and Ibn Ezra 
definitely meant them to be enigmatic. In order to decipher their meaning we have to 
recall Plotinus’ teaching concerning the universals. The first sentence (“Moses turned 
into a universal [Moshe shav kelali]”) is absurd if we take the term “universal” to 
mean an Aristotelian universal. However, with Plotinian universals the sentence 
makes perfect sense. 
 Criticizing Plato’s theory of Forms, Aristotle claimed that universals have no 
separate existence outside of the mind. The term “animal” refers only to individual 
animals in the extra-mental world. The term is applied on the basis of the existence of 
certain properties in the referents, such as life, ability of locomotion, and sense-
perception. In other words, if an x object has the properties “life,” “ability of loco-
motion,” and “ability of sense-perception,” then x is an animal. 
 Now the same x can be called a “horse” (or “snake” or “man”) if further 
properties are added to its description such as “four-legged” (or “having no legs” or 
“two-legged”). The more properties that are added to the description the smaller the 
number of individuals to which the term refers. Using the modern cocepts “intension” 
and “extension,” it is possible to say that there is a sort of inverted relation between 
the intension and extension of Aristotelian universals. 
 The properties that distinguish the species of a genus are called “differences” in 
Aristotelian terminology. These differences cannot be included among the properties 
defining the genus itself. For example, “four-legged” cannot be a property of “ani-
mal,” because that would mean that every “animal” is four-legged and consequently a 
sub-group could not be distinguished by this property from the rest of the animals. 
Therefore, Aristotle says, the differences must come “from the outside,” i.e. outside of 
the genus. 
                                               
41  Cf. the English translation by Alexander Altmann, “Moses Narboni’s Epistle…” 268 
based on a slightly different interpretation.  
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 This is the point where Plotinus launches his attack on Aristotle’s theory. What 
is this “outside” whence the differences are added to the genus? Having four legs is a 
characteristic of animal life (a table can have “four legs” only in a different sense of 
the word) just like having two legs or moving without any legs. In Plotinus’ vision, 
Animal is not only a human abstraction but a dynamic force of reality that restates 
itself through a series of mutually exclusive differences. Therefore, it is more logical 
to assume that the differences come from within the genus. They are all contained in 
an original and mysterious unity within the Form Animal, having a separate existence 
in the extra-mental world.42 
 A modern reader can compare Animal, having all the animal properties in an 
obscure unity, to the color white, which contains all the colors of the rainbow and has 
a homogenous quality at the same time. The process through which white light is 
fragmented by a prism and the colors inherent in it become visible corresponds to 
what Plotinus calls emanation: from the Animal having all animal properties together 
the individual animals proceed in making the hidden differences manifest. 
Consequently, the relation between intension and extension is direct: The more gen-
eral a Plotinian universal is, the more properties are inherent in it. 
 Aristotle would object that Plotinus’ Animal is self-contradictory, for it is four-
legged and two-legged and has no legs at the same time. Claiming the existence of 
such objects violates the principle of non-contradiction – the “most certain principle 
of all” for Aristotle.43 However, for Plotinus this only proves the limited validity of 
the principle of non-contradiction. The more subtle subjects of human speculation 
cannot be perceived unless the principle of non-contradiction is suspended. Plotinus 
and his followers constructed “mysterious objects” that can have mutually exclusive 
properties and used them extensively for describing the metaphysical realm.44 
 The ultimate source of emanation is God – which means that God’s essence 
contains everything in an obscure, mysterious unity. This is why Ibn Ezra calls God 
ha-kol “the Everything” in a number of places. This idea is also the kernel of the neo-
Platonic theory of divine knowledge and providence: God knows only His essence, 
but His essence is a Plotinian universal containing everything in an obscure unity, so 
God knows everything and his providence governs everything.45 
 Consequently, human individuals are also contained in God’s essence as Ploti-
nian universals. This is the “universal way” in which God knows us referred to in Ibn 
Ezra’s text. Our Plotinian universal in the divine essence can be perceived as a sort of 
guardian angel having our personality in a condensed form and pleading for us in the 
presence of God. The key quest of human life is to acquire the ability to receive 
emanation from our own Plotinian universals/guardian angel. The closer we get to the 
                                               
42  I follow the interpretation of A. C. Lloyd: The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 81–90. The key texts are: Plotinus, Eneads VI, 2, 5–6 and 13–14. 
43  Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Γ. 3. 1005b 15–20. 
44  Cf. Plotinus, Eneads, III, 16–17. Syrianus, the master of Proclus, commenting on 
Metaphysics B.3. 998b 22 argues that in fact the Peripatetics cannot avoid positing the 
existence of such objects either. Cf. Syriani in Metaphysica Commentaria, Commentaria 
in Aristotelem Graeca, ed. Guilelmus Kroll, vol. 6/1 (Berlin, 1902), 32. 
45  Cf. Proclus,  Théologie platonicienne: Livre I, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink 
(Paris: Société d’Édition “Les Belles Lettres,” 1968), 69–77; esp. 74–75 [I, 15]. Cf. also 
Ibn Ezra’s famous formula ha-kol yodea kol heleq al derekh kol ve-lo al derekh heleq in 
his short commentary on Genesis 18: 21. 
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source of our existence, the more blessing is poured over us. Moses managed to join 
his Plotinian universal completely – “Moses turned into a universal” – and thereby he 
entered the Divine Presence. This is related in Exodus 33 according to Ibn Ezra. 
 The Shiur Qoma (“Measurement of the Body”) itself describes God’s body as 
consisting of angels bearing mysterious divine names and gives the “measurements” 
(shiur) of every member of the divine body. The mystical vision ends with 
mentioning the fact that there is a phylactery [tefillin] on the divine head with the 
inscription “Israel.” 
 For Ibn Ezra the semantic key to understanding the text was exactly the theory 
of divine essence consisting of Plotinian universals (corresponding to the divine body 
consisting of angels). Israel’s position on the divine head conforms nicely to the idea 
of Israel’s election – the universals of the Israelites must have a privileged status 
within the whole structure. Rabbi Ishmael’s statement makes also perfect sense in this 
interpretation: “knowing the measurements of the Creator” must mean entering the 
divine essence as Moses did – and what else could be the “world to come”? Finally, 
the famous sentence about God creating man according to his “image” and “likeness” 
refers to the process of emanation: our human essences are all contained in the divine 
essence and all proceed from there – this is how we are created according to God’s 
“image and likeness.” 
 Ibn Ezra infers from the Shiur Qoma’s statement about God creating “all the 
bodies and all that are nobler than bodies” that the “accidents” being less noble than 
the bodies are not created by God. By “accidents” Ibn Ezra means something different 
from Aristotle’s “accidents.” The former accidents have a very negative connotation: 
they are the misfortunes that reach humans in the lower world. They do not add 
anything to our essence as Aristotelian accidents do. They rather decrease our 
essence, for they come from nothing. Salvation is to get rid of the “accidents” and to 
regain the original richness of our essence – “to turn into a universal” – in both Ibn 
Ezra’s and Ibn Gabirol’s philosophy. Accidents are the evil of the lower world; that is 
why they cannot be created by God, for God creates nothing evil; and evil is nothing 
but the privation of good. This is again a profoundly neo-Platonic sujet. 
 Ibn Ezra’s numerology is also based on the concept of Plotinian universals. His 
famous sentence, “each number is in the One potentially and [the One] is in each 
number actually” (kol mispar hu ba-ehad be-koah ve-hu be-kol mispar be-maase – 
Long Commentary on Exodus 3: 15), means that the One is a Plotinian universal for 
all the numbers. The relationship between the One and the numbers models the rela-
tionship between God and creation.46 
                                               
46  Modern scholars are usually unaware of the importance of Plotinian universals in 
understanding Ibn Ezra’s thoughts. It seems to me that a nineteenth-century Galician 
philosopher and cabbalist, Nachman Krochmal was more sensitive to this aspect of Ibn 
Ezra’s thought than contemporary historians of philosophy (though his attributing 
cabbalistic doctrines to Ibn Ezra is certainly wrong). Cf. his More nevukhe ha-zeman, in 
Simon Rawidowicz (ed.): Kitvei Nachman Krochmal (The Works of Nachman Krochmal) 
(London: Ararat, 1961 [1924]), 313–321. Cf. also Hermann Greive: Studien zum jüdischen 
Neuplatonismus: Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham Ibn Ezra, Studia Judaica 7, 
(Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 22.  
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Maimonides’ Rejection of “Mysterious Objects” 
For Ibn Ezra numbers and universals are mysterious objects. They are ambiguous by 
their natures. Their function is not simply to describe a reality independent of them. 
They also “embody” the ambiguous energies of reality within themselves and are 
often believed to have magical efficiency. In a sense they form the highest grade of 
reality that is outside of the reach of human mind. Mysterious objects resist clear 
definitions and coherent theories. You have to contemplate them and to speculate 
about them again and again, and the speculation will often lead you to paradoxical 
and confusing results. The correct way of transmitting this kind of knowledge is not to 
write a summary displaying a well-formed system of premises, arguments, and 
conclusions, but to pronounce enigmatic statements – often as comments on sacred 
texts, divine names, etc. – the implications of which should be unfolded in the process 
of meditation. Consequently, the reader is expected to meditate on the mysteries of 
the text and to accept the mysteries on authority rather than to judge them by applying 
critical methods.  
 Maimonides’ halakhic program was based on a different culture of reading. In 
this culture the author is expected to provide the reader with clear and unambiguous 
statements that are open to public debate. The merits of a text are not dependent on 
the profundity of the meditation the reader performs as a response to the text but by 
the capacity of its content to resist refutation by the public. Such a culture of reading 
could not tolerate the existence of mysterious objects within scholarly discourse. 
Once these norms were applied to philosophical literature as well, Maimonides could 
no longer take seriously the assumptions of neo-Platonic mystics, in spite of the fact 
that probably he himself had shared some of them in his youth. In The Guide of the 
Perplexed (cc. 1190) Maimonides writes with open contempt about the mystical and 
magical speculations concerning the divine names: 
 
[…] do not let occur to your mind the vain imaginings of the writers of charms 
or what names you may hear from them or may find in their stupid books, 
names that they have invented, which are not indicative of any notion what-
soever, but which they call [divine] names and of which they think that they 
necessitate holiness and purity and work miracles. All these are stories that it is 
not seemly for a perfect man to listen to, much less to believe.47 
[…] When wicked and ignorant people found these texts, they had great scope 
for lying statements in that they would put together any letters they liked and 
would say: this is a [divine] name that has efficacy and the power to operate if it 
is written down or uttered in a particular way. Thereupon these lies invented by 
the first wicked and ignorant man were written down, and these writings 
transmitted to good, pious, and foolish men who lack the scales by means of 
which they could know the true from the false. These people accordingly made 
a secret of these writings, and the latter were found in the belongings left behind 
them, so that they were thought to be correct. To sum it up: A fool believes 
everything. (Prov. 14: 15)48  
                                               
47  Moses Maimonides: The Guide of the Perplexed, tr. Shlomo Pines (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 149 [I, 61] – hereafter “GP; tr. Pines” 
(e.g. GP I, 61 tr. Pines, 149). 
48  GP I, 62 tr. Pines, 152.  
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A Disciple of Farabi? 
It is a common-place in present day Maimonidean scholarship that Farabi was the 
most important source and authority for Maimonides on a number of philosophical 
questions.49 This statement is correct in one sense but false in another. Maimonides 
himself pointed to Farabi as the best available interpreter of Aristotelian logic.50 The 
Guide of the Perplexed contains a number of explicit and implicit quotations from 
Farabi. However, I will argue in the following paragraphs that Maimonides probably 
did not accept and possibly did not even understand an important aspect of Farabi’s 
thought. It is possible that he systematically misread Farabi’s theory of emanation in 
order to adjust it to his own ideas. 
 It seems to me that Farabi himself, writing in the first half of tenth century, 
understood Plotinian universals very well and employed them extensively. In his 
Harmony of Plato’s and Aristotle’s Philosophy, Farabi openly admits the existence of 
Platonic Forms within the divine essence.51 A passage in another work, The 
Aphorisms of the Statesman, describes emanation as the realization of possibilities 
inherent in a species. In the case of certain species, for example, “sun” or “moon,” 
one individual is able to realize all the inherent possibilities. Consequently, there is 
only one individual (the Sun or the Moon) belonging to each of these species 
respectively, for nature does nothing in vain. However, in the case of other species, 
such as “horse” or “snake” or “human being,” many individuals are needed to realize 
all the inherent possibilities; this is why there are many horses, snakes, and human 
beings. Emanation is perceived as explication of what is hidden in a universal.52 
  Maimonides proposed a completely different version of the emanation theory. 
For him, emanation is bringing into actuality what was in potentiality before. The 
Aristotelian concepts potentiality and actuality are used extensively in the discourse. 
The Active Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl) does not bring forth what is inherent in itself 
but realizes the possibilities that are inherent in the recipients of its emanation. The 
translator of the following quotation, Shlomo Pines, uses the phrase ‘overflow’ for 
‘emanation:’ 
 
The tenth intellect is the Active Intellect, whose existence is indicated by the 
facts that our intellects pass from potentiality to actuality and that the forms of 
the existents that are subject to generation and corruption are actualized after 
they have been in their matter only in potentia. Now everything that passes from 
potentiality to actuality must have necessarily something that causes it to pass 
and that is outside it. And this cause must belong to the species of that which it 
causes to pass from potentiality to actuality. For a carpenter does not build a 
storehouse qua a maker, but because there subsists in his mind the form of the 
storehouse. For it is the form of the storehouse subsisting in the mind of the 
carpenter that caused the form of the storehouse to pass into actuality and to be 
                                               
49  Cf. for example, Lawrence Berman, “Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfarabi,”  Israel 
Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 154–178. 
50  Cf. Marx, “Texts by and about Maimonides,” 378–380. 
51  Cf. Fr. Dieterici (tr.), Alfarabi’s Philosophische Abhandlungen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1892), 43–47; esp. 46. 
52  Farabi, Fusūl al-Madanī. Aphorisms of the Statesman, ed. and tr. D. M. Dunlop 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 59 [Arabic text: p. 147]. 
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realized in timber. In this way the giver of the form is indubitably a separate 
form, and that which brings intellect into existence is an intellect, namely the 
Active Intellect. Thus the relation of the Active Intellect to the elements and that 
which is composed of them is similar to the relation obtaining between every 
separate intellect particularly related to a sphere and that sphere. Furthermore 
the relation of the intellect in actu existing in us, which derives from an 
overflow of the Active Intellect and through which we apprehend the Active 
Intellect, is similar to that of the intellect of every sphere that exists in the latter, 
deriving its being in it from the overflow of a separate intellect – an intellect 
through which the sphere apprehends the separate intellect, makes a mental re-
presentation of the latter, desires to become like it, and, in consequence, 
moves.53 
 
 A modern reader can imagine this process as turning on the light in a dark room. 
What was not visible in the room before becomes visible thanks to the light coming 
from the bulb. However, the visible forms, colors, etc. themselves were never 
“hidden” in the light itself (unlike the colors of the rainbow in white light). Rather, 
they were hidden “in potentia” in the dark room itself. An anonymous thirteenth-
century interpreter writing about Maimonides’ theory of prophecy emphasizes the fact 
that the Active Intellect has no relation to the things produced by its emanation: 
 
[…] the prophet is about to know the future concerning practical things and to 
teach his contemporaries good morals. But there is no relationship whatsoever 
between the Active Intellect – being the cause of prophecy – and these matters 
[i.e. telling the future and admonishing people]. All that happens is that an 
emanation coming from the Active Intellect reaches the intellectual faculty and 
teaches it the truth of reality in its entirety within a moment without premises 
and demonstrations. And this intellectual emanation emanates to the imaginative 
[fol. 13 r] faculty as well, so that it receives the emanation in order to know 
tremendous things about the future […] with the help of the Active Intellect and 
with the help of his own intellect on which [the Active Intellect] has worked.54 
  
 This version of the emanation theory presupposes the existence of recipients that 
ultimately receive the emanation from God and claims that the differences between 
created things are not due to the explication of the original differences hidden in 
God’s nature but are rooted in the recipients themselves. The recipients are potentially 
different from each other; emanation brings these differences into actuality. 
 Needless to say, according to Maimonides the recipients themselves were 
created by God. However, creation is not the same as emanation. A theory of ema-
nation can describe how God normally sustains the order of this world we are familiar 
with. Creation is a miracle, a unique event that no human mind is able to grasp. 
Creation cannot be compared to any normal process of the world.55 This is a very 
important principle of Maimonides’ philosophy and can be contrasted with Ibn Ezra’s 
interpretation of Genesis 1: 26 as referring to a process of emanation. 
                                               
53  GP II, 4; tr. Pines, 257–258. 
54  Ruah hen, chapter 4.  MS Vienna, ÖNB, Heb. 62, fol. 12 v –13 r. 
55  Cf. GP II, 17. 
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 Instead of using ambiguous concepts, such as “mysterious objects,” Maimonides 
prefers to draw a clear demarcation line between those things we know and those 
things we do not know. The former should be described by coherent theories and 
models, whereas the later are declared to be unreachable by human knowledge. 
Whereas Ibn Ezra attempts to penetrate the ultimate mysteries of existence by using 
enigmatic language, Maimonides either proposes a clear and coherent account or 
remains silent: 
 
As everyone is aware that it is not possible, except through negation, to achieve 
an apprehension of that which is in our power to apprehend, and that, on the 
other hand, negation does not give knowledge in any respect of the true reality 
of the thing with regard to which the particular matter in question has been ne-
gated – all men, those of the past and those of the future, affirm clearly that 
God, may He be exalted, cannot be apprehended by the intellects, and that none 
but He Himself can apprehend what He is, and that apprehension of Him con-
sists in the inability to attain the ultimate term in apprehending Him. Thus all 
the philosophers say: We are dazzled by His beauty, and He is hidden from us 
because of the intensity with which He becomes manifest, just as the sun is 
hidden to eyes that are too weak to apprehend it. This has been expatiated upon 
in words that it would serve no useful purpose to repeat here. The most apt 
phrase concerning this subject is the dictum occurring in the Psalms, Silence is 
praise to Thee (Ps. 65: 2), which interpreted signifies: silence with regard to 
You is praise. This is a most perfectly put phrase regarding this matter. For of 
whatever we say intending to magnify and exalt, on the one hand we find that it 
can have some application to Him, may He be exalted, and on the other hand we 
perceive in it some deficiency. Accordingly, silence and limiting oneself to the 
apprehensions of the intellects are more appropriate – just as the perfect ones 
have enjoined when they said: Commune with your own heart upon your bed 
and be still. Sellah (Ps. 4: 5).56 
 
 However, in the next section we shall see that Maimonides had to compromise 
his ideal to a certain degree. 
The Spiritual Experience 
Eliminating Plotinian universals from the emanation theory enabled Maimonides to 
formulate a strictly negative theology. There is no similarity whatsoever between the 
ultimate source of emanation (God) and its recipients. No words or concepts are 
capable of describing the essence of God. At best we can say what God is not, and we 
can understand (and even imitate) His actions in the world. But these actions never 
express or explicate the very essence of God.57 
 Maimonides believed that with the help of his negative theology he had ma-
naged to rediscover the original core experience of Jewish spirituality. By “spiri-
tuality” I mean a practice of self-transformation necessary for the attainment of 
certain types of truth. It was a common belief among medieval theologians that in 
                                               
56  GP I, 59; tr. Pines, 139–140. Italics are in the original. 
57  The principal treatment of the topic is in GP I, 50–60. 
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order to grasp the most important dimensions of reality it is not enough to be clever, 
diligent, or well-trained in arts and sciences; a transformation of the self is also re-
quired that can be attained, for example, by prayer, asceticism, celibacy, or observing 
religious law.58 For example, Avicenna writes about prayer as an integral part of his 
philosophical methodology.59 Syphilis destroying the brain of Adrian Leverkühn in 
Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus, enabling the composer to become a true genius (and 
also to see the devil), is a bizarre modern counterpart of this medieval idea of 
spirituality. 
 Maimonides instructs his favorite student, Joseph ben Judah, about how to 
acquire spiritual experience in the following lines: 
 
A call to attention. We have already made it clear to you that that intellect 
which overflowed from Him, may He be exalted, toward us is the bond be-
tween us and Him. You have the choice: if you wish to strengthen and to 
fortify this bond [i.e. the intellect], you can do so; if, however, you wish 
gradually to make it weaker and feebler until you cut it, you can also do that. 
[…] Know that even if you were the man who knew most the true reality of 
the divine science, you would cut that bond existing between you and God if 
you would empty your thought of God and busy yourself totally in eating the 
necessary or in occupying yourselves with the necessary. You would not be 
with Him then, nor He with you. […] Know that all the practices of the 
worship, such as reading the Torah, prayer, and the performance of the other 
commandments, have only the end of training you to occupy yourself with His 
commandments, may He be exalted, rather than with matters pertaining to this 
world […]  
From here on I will begin to give you guidance with regard to the form of this 
training so that you should achieve this great end. The first thing that you 
should cause your soul to hold fast onto is that, while reciting the Shema 
prayer, you should empty your mind of everything and pray thus. […] When 
this has been carried out correctly and has been practiced consistently for 
years, cause your soul, whenever you read or listen to the Torah, to be 
constantly directed – the whole of you and your thought – toward reflection on 
what you are listening to or reading. When this too has been practiced 
consistently for a certain time, cause your soul to be in such a way that your 
thought is always quite free of distraction and gives heed to all that you are 
reading of the other discourses of the prophets and even when you read all the 
benedictions, so that you aim at meditating on what you are uttering and at 
considering its meaning. […] When, however, you are alone with yourself and 
no one else is there and while you lie awake upon your bed, you should take 
great care during these precious times not to set your thought to work on 
anything other than that intellectual worship consisting in nearness to God and 
being in His presence in that true reality that I have made known to you and 
not by way of affections of the imagination. In my opinion this end can be 
                                               
58  On the concept and history of “spirituality” see Michel Foucault: L’herméneutique du 
sujet: cours au Collège de France (1981–82) (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). 
59  Cf. Dimitri Gutas: Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden, New York, 
København, etc.: E. J. Brill, 1988), 181–183. 
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achieved by those of the men of knowledge who have rendered their souls 
worthy of it by training of this kind.60 
 
 For a spiritual experience one has to already be well trained in the principles of 
Maimonidean theology. The experience itself is the realization of this teaching. It is 
not enough to know in theory that God is not similar to anything. You have to realize 
this fact, at least in certain situations (for example, during prayer). You have to realize 
that God is not an old man with long white beard sitting on a throne somewhere in 
heaven. You have to realize that God is not some ghost flying in the air. You have to 
realize that no imagination can grasp God’s essence. You have to realize that the 
presence of God cannot be limited by any human concept or name. You are in the 
presence of God and in the hand of God right now. He can judge you and take away 
your life at any moment. The fact that you are still alive is due to the infinite mercy of 
God. If a tremendous fear and feeling of gratefulness fills you at these moments, then 
you have managed to perform the spiritual exercise. 
 This experience results in a decision to live a better life. A better life according 
to Maimonides’ definition of ultimate human perfection means “imitation of God’s 
actions.”61 Consequently, you have to understand God’s actions. 
 There are two great fields of divine actions according to Maimonides: Nature 
and the Torah. Knowledge concerning the actions of Nature and the action of the 
Divine Law leads human beings to understand the divine mercy, wisdom and justice 
inherent in them. This knowledge enables us to imitate God’s actions and by this we 
can become better recipients of the divine emanation. As long as we are merciful, 
wise, and just, we ourselves become the means of divine mercy, wisdom, and justice. 
God’s emanation will be realized through us. 
 The study of halakha and the study of philosophy are dependent on the program 
of spiritual transformation in Maimonides’ opinion. This is why he insisted on the 
integrity of halakha as a system in opposition to many medieval (and modern) 
halakhic authorities, who codified only the practically relevant topics of Jewish law 
and skipped, for example, the laws concerning the Sanctuary. The point of studying 
the Talmud is not simply to get the necessary information about how to perform 
certain rites in the synagogue or elsewhere. What matters is understanding the actions 
of God. The spiritual experience is the ultimate corner-stone of Maimonides’ 
thought.62 
                                               
60  GP III, 51; tr. Pines, 621–623.  Spirituality is the central topic of the concluding 
chapters of the Guide (III, 51–54). 
61  Cf. GP III, 54, tr. Pines, 637–638. 
62  Isadore Twersky’s Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah) (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 356–364 and 509 contains further 
relevant points concerning the “central vision of Maimonideanism.” The concept of 
spirituality and the spiritual aspects of Maimonides’ thought are usually ignored in present 
day scholarship. One of the few exceptions is David R. Blumenthal who – following the 
footsteps of Georges Vajda – proposes the concept of “philosophical mysticism” to 
describe what Maimonides is doing in the last chapters of the Guide. Cf. his “Maimonides: 
Prayer, Worship and Mysticism,” in Approaches in Judaism in Medieval Times, vol. 3, ed. 
David R. Blumenthal (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 1–16.  
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Technical versus Spiritual Knowledge 
Meditation on God’s actions, however, reintroduced a topic into Maimonides’ thought 
that cannot be described properly by coherent theories. To realize the wisdom and the 
justice inherent in the movement of the stars or the laws concerning Shabbat is not the 
same type of intellectual activity as proposing an astronomical theory or deciding 
halakhot. Consequently, discussing this topic Maimonides cannot but use formulas 
resembling the words of neo-Platonists writing about mysterious objects. For 
example, in the introduction to The Guide of the Perplexed we read about the 
“flaming” nature of spiritual knowledge. What we understand of God’s actions during 
the spiritual experience – when we are in an elevated state of consciousness – we are 
sometimes unable to state in clear terms or even to remember  properly once the 
experience passes: 
 
You should not think that these great secrets are fully and completely known to 
anyone among us. They are not. But sometimes truth flashes out to us so that we 
think that it is a day, and then matter and habit in their various forms conceal it 
so that we find ourselves again in an obscure night, almost as we were at first.63 
 
 Gyöngyi Hegedűs, in her masterful dissertation on Saadya gaon’s philosophy, 
proposes a distinction between “externalist” and “internalist” forms of knowledge 
within the oeuvre of the gaon. Some of the apparent self-contradictions of Saadya’s 
two philosophical works that were written practically at the same time – namely, The 
Book of Beliefs and Opinions and the Commentary on the Sefer Yetsira – are due to 
the fact that Saadya chose different approaches to reality in each of them. The Book of 
Beliefs and Opinions shows “externalism” and “foundationalism,” whereas the 
Commentary on the Sefer Yetsira can be characterized by “internalism” and 
“coherentism.” These terms are taken from contemporary discussions about the nature 
of knowledge in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition. Hegedűs emphasizes that 
Saadya worked with both types of knowledge at the same time.64 
 Perhaps a similar distinction should be made concerning technical and spiritual 
knowledge in Maimonides’ thought. Philosophy, medical science, astronomy, and 
other sciences, just like halakha, formed first and foremost a body of technical 
knowledge for Maimonides. They are based on clear principles available for everyone 
and their results can be discussed and judged in public debate. However, these 
sciences have little value if their study does not result in spiritual transformation. 
Once the spiritual transformation is experienced the student will gain a different type 
of knowledge that cannot be properly displayed in public discourse. This spiritual 
knowledge consists of meditation on the mercy, wisdom, and justice of God’s actions 
and about their imitation in one’s personal life. 
 In my opinion the conflict between technical and spiritual knowledge gave rise 
to both the self-contradictions in Maimonides’ Guide and his notorious “esotericism.” 
                                               
63  GP, intr.; tr. Pines, 7. Cf. also GP I, 33; tr. Pines, 71. 
64  Gyöngyi Hegedűs: Saadya Gaon: Philosopher or Apologist? (Unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation, Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, 2000), 67–
76. On the externalism/internalism distinction see Laurence BonJour: “Externalism/ 
internalism,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa 
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Moreover, the differences between technical and spiritual knowledge lie at the 
problem of “perplexity” to which The Guide of the Perplexed is meant to be a re-
sponse. In order to grasp properly the social and intellectual dimensions of Maimo-
nides’ elitism and esotericism we have to outline his working conditions at the 
bīmāristān of Cairo in the second half of his life. 
The Bīmāristān 
After the tragic death of his brother in 1169, Maimonides had to use his medical 
knowledge,  probably acquired in Morocco, to sustain his family. He worked at the 
bīmāristān of Cairo. The bīmāristān was a hospital and a place of instruction where 
Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Samaritan physicians and medical students worked 
together. The institution was an inter-faith workshop for medical sciences and 
possibly also for natural philosophy. The feeling of collegiality among the doctors 
was stronger than religious differences. 
 The bīmāristān was a place for elite people and elite studies. Applicants had to 
meet strict requirements in order to be admitted. They were expected to have learned 
the basic ideas of Hippocrates and Galen alone or with the help of a private tutor. 
They were also expected to have had some medical experience in the form of an 
apprenticeship to a practicing physician and to have a “Certificate of Good Conduct” 
(tazkiya) issued by the wāli – a sort of police captain in medieval Cairo. (Deserving 
the later document was not so much a matter of good conduct as of appropriate 
connections or presents given to the wāli.) Not many could afford all these 
expenses.65 
 On the other hand, the investment usually paid off. Entering the bīmāristān was 
often the beginning of a splendid career. Maimonides himself not only became a star 
physician celebrated sometimes in the poems of his grateful patients. He entered the 
service of the sultan Saladin and his court and thereby gained tremendous influence 
on social and political matters in the Jewish community as well, though, as far as we 
know, he never became the official leader of Egyptian Jewry.66  
“Perplexity” and Elitism 
Jewish physicians and students at the bīmāristān had to face intellectual and emo-
tional problems that the rest of the population could easily ignore. Working at the 
hospital, they were exposed day after day to the fact that the fate of patients depended 
not on their religious merits but on the physical condition of their bodies. Hippocratic 
medical science and Aristotelian natural philosophy provided them with a general 
framework of interpreting these experiences. Aristotelian natural philosophy was 
verified every day in the practice of the bīmāristān; students and physicians had 
                                               
65  Cf. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, vol. 2, 240–272; esp. 247–253. 
66  Cf. Jacob Levinger: “Was Maimonides Rais al-Yahud in Egypt?” in Isadore Twersky, 
(ed.): Studies in Maimonides (Cambridge, Ma and London: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 83–93 and Davidson, Moses Maimonides, 54-64. Some researchers are reluctant to 
accept Levinger’s conclusions, but no convincing refutation has been published so far to 
my best knowledge.  
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practically no reason to doubt the correctness of their scientific outlook – just as 
modern scientists do not question science itself even if it does not provide solutions to 
every problem. 
 Many of the scientific phenomena they witnessed clearly contradicted 
statements learned from the Bible and the Talmud and their traditional interpretations. 
For example, Aristotle’s Meteorology taught that rainfall is dependent on natural 
factors rather than on prayer or the religious behavior of people.67 Jewish students at 
the bīmāristān experienced a different sort of reality than the one they were 
accustomed to at home and at the synagogue within the Jewish community. 
The bīmāristān was an inter-faith workshop for constructing a scientific re-
ality independent of the presuppositions of the monotheistic faiths. For the Jews 
participating in this, it must have been difficult to join their coreligionists in “naïve” 
worship of the Biblical God. But this worship – prayers, blessings, rites, etc. – was an 
indispensable part of medieval Jewish life. “Perplexity” was a complex emotional and 
intellectual problem for those members of the Jewish elite employed at the bīmāristān 
or involved in similar activities. Today we would call it cognitive dissonance. 
 Moreover, Maimonides’ systematic reading of virtually any type of literature – 
including the Bible, the Talmud, Aristotle, Farabi, Hippocrates, and Galen – shar-
pened the sense of contradiction. Confronted with the problem of anthropomorphic 
expressions in the Bible, Abraham Ibn Ezra, writing a few decades earlier, could 
simply refer to the good old Talmudic principle “The Torah speaks human 
language.”68 The problem of anthropomorphism needed no further comment. As for 
Maimonides, he could not avoid the Bible systematically looking for a coherent 
message that could be and should be translated into mental language. 
Anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible could not be explained away simply as 
metaphors. Maimonides had to consider seriously the possibility that Scripture 
teaches an anthropomorphic theory of God – an idea that could hardly be reconciled 
with negative theology and his vision of spirituality. 
 By “perplexity” Maimonides did not mean simply a conflict of reason and faith. 
The conflict was not between science and religion but between religion and religion. 
Philosophical considerations led Maimonides to a recognition of the “correct” form of 
spirituality. But was this spirituality the spirituality of Judaism? Philosophical religion 
and traditional Jewish religion were both well-organized and systematic discourses in 
the eyes of Maimonides by the time he worked at the bīmāristān. That is to say, if 
they are built on mutually exclusive premises then you cannot but choose between 
them. You are either a philosopher or a Jew. 
 Mutatis mutandis this was the way Ghazzali put the question when it occurred to 
him almost a century before Maimonides. Ghazzali’s answer was to embrace Islam 
and to reject philosophy. He also pointed out that Farabi and Avicenna were 
necessarily inconsistent when they tried to be both Muslims and philosophers. 
 Maimonides was not convinced by the correctness of Ghazzali’s arguments. 
Perhaps he had been taught in his youth by the members of Ibn Bajja’s circle how to 
refute Ghazzali’s Incoherence of the Philosophers. The mission of his philosophical 
treatise, The Guide of the Perplexed (completed around 1190), was not to improvise 
                                               
67  Cf. Shem Tov’s commentary on Maimonides’ The Guide of the Perplexed II, 30, s. v. 
“ve-im yillaqah lefi nistaro” in [Maimonides:] More nevukhim […] im shelosha perushim 
[…]  (Warsawa: Yitzhak Goldman, 1872), 60a. 
68  Cf. his short commentary on Genesis 6: 6. 
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some ad hoc reconciliation of reason and faith but to show that philosophical religion 
and Jewish religion built up one systematic discourse. Maimonides wanted to prove 
that philosophical spirituality as he conceived it was identical with the original Jewish 
– Biblical and Talmudic – spirituality. 
 The key idea of Maimonides’ solution was the application of the notion of 
mental language again. The introductory chapter of The Guide of the Perplexed starts 
with the following words: 
 
The first purpose of this Treatise is to explain the meanings of certain terms oc-
curring in books of prophecy. Some of these terms are equivocal; hence the ig-
norant attribute to them only one or some of the meanings in which the term in 
question is used. Others are derivative terms; hence they attribute to them only 
the original meaning from which the other meaning is derived. Others are am-
phibolous terms, so that at times they are believed to be univocal and at other 
times equivocal.69 
 In other words, the Bible is written in a natural language (Biblical Hebrew) that 
is characterized by the use of homonymous and ambiguous words. For the correct 
understanding of the prophetic texts, homonyms and ambiguous terms must be iden-
tified and their senses must be classified. That is to say, the Bible has to be translated 
from Hebrew into the mental language. Such a translation will show that the Bible in 
fact does not say that God has an anthropomorphic body or any kind of body, that 
God has passions, or that God changes, etc. The true message of the Bible contains 
nothing absurd from the philosophical point of view, although it does not necessarily 
agree on every question with the doctrine of Aristotle and his followers. The first part 
of the Guide is mainly devoted to the analysis of Biblical Hebrew homonyms 
concerning God. 
 The second step was to show that Jewish religious practice revolves around the 
spiritual experience described by Maimonides. This philosophical spirituality is the 
very essence of Jewish religious observance. Maimonides explains to his “perplexed” 
readers that prayers, blessings, and other rites are completely justified from the 
philosophical perspective as well. Correctly practiced, the Torah indeed brings man 
into the presence of God. As we have seen (in the section on spiritual experience), 
Maimonides gave further guidelines on how to achieve this result. 
 A third component of Maimonides’ reply is a partial justification of popular 
beliefs. It was a widely circulated commonplace for many centuries before Maimo-
nides composed the Guide that the messages of sacred books are often adjusted to 
historical circumstances and to the intellectual and moral level of the lower strata of  
society. That is to say, these texts sometimes teach a simplified version of truth or 
even “noble lies.” It is obligatory for the vulgar to believe in these doctrines, whereas 
the elite may dispense with them in a number of ways, for example, by attributing an 
esoteric sense to the same words or by allegoric interpretation.70 Maimonides was by 
no means the first who applied this notion to Judaism.71 He definitely contrasts the 
                                               
69  GP, intr.; tr. Pines, 5. 
70  Cf. GP, intr.; tr. Pines, 5–14; and I, 31; tr. Pines, 66–67. 
71  Philo of Alexandria, more than a millennium before Maimonides, used surprisingly 
similar formulas. Cf. his Quod Deus immutabilis sit, 60–68.  
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beliefs of the simple-minded Jews with those of the elite, as in GP II, 32. However, 
the significance of such texts should not be overestimated. In my opinion this was not 
the most important facet of his elitism and esotericism. 
Maimonides’ Esotericism: A Critique of Leo Strauss 
The real cause of both his esotericism and elitism is the difference between technical 
and spiritual knowledge. This difference has both theoretical and educational aspects 
and sometimes it turns into a real conflict. 
 As for the theoretical aspect, the results of technical and spiritual knowledge are 
not necessarily in harmony. For example, Maimonides harshly criticizes “the 
philosophers” for their restricting divine providence to the species in the sublunary 
world.72 For Maimonides it was absurd to deny that God’s providence reaches human 
individuals, not only humanity as a species. This conviction is probably derived from 
personal spiritual experience. Once you manage to perform the spiritual 
transformation, it will be obvious to you that God knows you and cares for you. 
However, from the point of view of technical philosophy it is difficult to maintain this 
position. Maimonides makes painstaking efforts to define a doctrine of individual 
providence and to show that its truth is at least not impossible. However, for a student 
who has never experienced spiritual transformation “the philosophers” account might 
be more persuasive. 
 Technical knowledge can be gained without any spiritual preparation. However, 
it should not be obtained so. Difficulties might lead the unprepared student astray. 
Failure to solve certain theoretical problems might result in a weakening of the 
religious faith or in an impatient rejection of philosophy as such. Thus, purely 
technical knowledge can harm its recipient. It is possible that Maimonides saw some 
negative examples of this at the bīmāristān. 
 On the other hand, technical knowledge is a prerequisite for achieving a true 
spiritual experience. Thus, a teacher of philosophy is in a difficult position: technical 
instruction must be preceded by spiritual readiness and spiritual instruction is incon-
ceivable without technical preparation. It is not possible to invent an overall strategy 
for teaching philosophy. Every student is a different case; spiritual and technical 
aspects must be combined continuously and differently in each case.73 
 In the Talmudic ruling concerning the transmission of esoteric lore (maase 
bereshit “the issue of creation” and maase merkava “the issue of the chariot” cf. 
Mishnah, Hagiga 2: 1) Maimonides recognizes the traditional Jewish answer to this 
problem. He identifies maase bereshit with physics and maase merkava with meta-
physics and tries to imitate the supposedly original methods of Jewish esotericism in 
his Guide. Thus The Guide of the Perplexed is formally a collection of letters to his 
beloved student, Joseph ben Judah, in accordance with the halakha that the secrets of 
creation are to be transmitted to only one student. Moreover, he emphasizes that his 
accounts of certain theories are often condensed and the reader is expected to find out 
                                               
72  Cf. GP III, 16; tr. Pines, 461. Maimonides’ tone is unusually harsh in criticizing the 
philosopher’s doctrine of providence. 
73  The principal discussion of the topic is in GP I, 31–35; tr. Pines, 65–79. 
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the implications alone. Maimonides’ assumption is that only the well-prepared readers 
will be able to do so.74  
 To sum up, in The Guide of the Perplexed Maimonides compromises his general 
strategy of reading and writing to a great degree. Although some parts of it are 
remarkably well-organized and systematic, the philosophical opus magnum as a 
whole is a rather chaotic collection of commentaries on certain biblical verses and 
Talmudic passages, critical remarks on Muslim and Christian philosophers and 
theologians, and discussions of astronomical, physical, and metaphysical theories. 
The reader is expected to process this raw material and work out the system behind it 
alone. In this sense it is certainly justifiable to call the Guide an esoteric book. 
 The conflict between technical and spiritual knowledge has a further aspect: 
spiritual knowledge can be self-contradictory in technical terms. In other words, those 
propositions that we derive from our spiritual experience – and, needless to say, we 
cannot but accept them as long as we believe in the possibility of spirituality – might 
turn out to contradict each other. 
 For example, spiritual experience establishes the thesis that God has free will. 
Maimonides again harshly criticizes Aristotle and his followers for their claim that the 
world proceeds necessarily from the nature of God rather than being created by divine 
free will.75 At the same time, God’s existence is obviously implied in the spiritual 
experience as well. According to Maimonides the only conclusive proof for the 
existence of God is based on the eternity of the world.  In Maimonides’ opinion, 
however, eternity of the world implies the theory of necessary emanation and ex-
cludes the possibility of divine free will.76 The implications of the spiritual experience 
cannot be reconstructed consistently in terms of technical knowledge. Maimonides 
would add the reservation that Moses and the other prophets and possibly even the 
Talmudic rabbis might have been able to eliminate the inconsistencies, though we no 
longer know how they did it. 
 The notorious “seventh cause” of the self-contradictions mentioned in the intro-
ductory chapter of the Guide addresses exactly this problem, in my opinion. Self-
contradictions are simply unavoidable in speculation about “profound matters.” 
Consequently, the philosopher has to conceal the fact of self-contradiction from the 
sight of the vulgar and unprepared students whose faith in God or trust in reason 
might be harmed by them. Yair Lorberbaum has argued convincingly that Leo Strauss 
fundamentally misunderstood the very text of the “seventh cause.” Self-contradictions 
were not a means for Maimonides to hide his “true, esoteric” opinions but the very 
things to be concealed.77 
                                               
74  Cf. GP, intr.; tr. Pines, 6–9 and I, 32–33; tr. Pines, 68–72. 
75  GP II, 21; tr. Pines, 314–317 and GP II, 25; tr. Pines, 327–330. 
76  On this topic cf. my “Maimonides’ Proof for the Existence of God: A Concealed 
Inconsistency,” in Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU,  vol. 9, ed. Katalin Szende, Judith 
A. Rasson, and Marcell Sebők (Budapest:Central European University, 2003), 29–50. 
77  Yair Lorberbaum: “Ha-sibba ha-sheviit: al ha-setirot be-’More ha-nevukhim’ – iyyun 
mehuddash” (The Seventh Cause: On Contradictions in Maimonides’ Guide of the 
Perplexed), Tarbiz 69 (1999/2000): 211–237. 
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 In my opinion, Leo Strauss’ perception of Maimonides’ esotericism78 is far too 
narrow and misleading in many respects. The point for Maimonides was not so much 
to avoid persecution or to reveal his secret heresy (!), but to save the unprepared 
reader from the difficulties emerging from the difference between spiritual and 
technical knowledge. 
 The notion of “persecution and the art of writing” has explanatory force only 
concerning Maimonides’ criticism of Islam. For example, in GP II, 40 he alludes to 
Aristotle’s verdict concerning the disgraceful nature of the sense of touch (quoted 
already in a complicated sentence in GP II, 36); he points out that sexuality is based 
on the sense of touch, and he emphasizes that no true prophet can have a sexual life as 
long as he receives prophecy from God. The last words of the chapter admonish the 
reader that something more is implied in this line of argument.79 The solution is easy: 
Muhammad had many wives and daughters even after receiving the supposed 
revelation from heaven; consequently, he could not have been a true prophet. Writing 
down this sentence explicitly would have been a violation of the Treaty of Omar, 
deserving capital punishment in Saladin’s state. In this case esotericism was indeed 
about avoiding persecution. 
 However, from this it does not follow that the traditional image of Maimonides 
as an orthodox Jewish philosopher needs any revision. Unconditional loyalty to 
rabbinic Judaism was the alpha and omega of Maimonides’ life and work. 
The Maimonidean Program 
In The Guide of the Perplexed Maimonides attempts to rediscover the lost theological 
doctrine of Moses and the prophets of ancient Israel. This doctrine was believed by 
Maimonides to have been an oral tradition among the Israelites for many generations 
and to be the true message of Scripture. It was also a widespread belief in the age that 
Plato and Aristotle learned their philosophies ultimately from Moses. However, 
Moses’ original theology had been lost due to persecution; therefore, all we can do is 
attempt to reconstruct it on the basis of the Bible and Aristotle.80 
 The point for Maimonides is not so much to “reconcile” the Bible and Aristotle 
but to rediscover the lost Mosaic philosophy by using all possible historical evidence 
– including the Bible, Aristotle, and the writings of ancient pagans (the Sabeans). 
Apparent inconsistencies in Mosaic theology are due to our own failure to reconstruct 
the teachings of the “father of the prophets.” 
 Jewish philosophers in subsequent generations continued Maimonides’ attempts 
at rediscovering Mosaic philosophy. Inspired by Imre Lakatos’ notion of a “scientific 
research program” Gad Freudenthal has proposed the term “Maimonidean research 
program”[“le programme de recherche maïmonidien”] to describe this phenomenon.81 
                                               
78  Cf. his famous essay: Leo Strauss, “The Literary Character of the Guide for the 
Perplexed,” in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1980 [1952]), 38–94. 
79  Cf. GP II, 40; tr. Pines, 384–385. 
80  Cf. GP I, 71; tr. Pines, 175–176. 
81  Gad Freudenthal: “Gersonide, génie solitaire. Remarques sur l’évolution de sa pensée 
et de ses méthodes sur quelques points,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le 
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Biblical and Talmudic texts were read carefully again and again and their possible 
philosophic and scientific implications were pointed out. Maimonides’ authority and 
influence was central but not exclusive. In both exegetical and metaphysical questions 
Abraham Ibn Ezra’s writings were continuously consulted and they exercised 
tremendous impact on Maimonides’ followers, especially during the fourteenth 
century.82 
Conclusion 
Judaism experienced a profound transformation during the life and in the works of 
Moses Maimonides. In my opinion, this transformation is still in adequately described 
and improperly understood in present-day scholarship. Many of the wide-spread 
notions of current Maimonidean scholarship, such as the Golden Age of Spanish 
Jewry, Maimonides as a disciple of Farabi, the esotericism of The Guide of Perplexed, 
and “reconciliation of Reason and Faith,” hinder our appreciation of Maimonides’ 
significance.   
 
                                                                                                                
maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. Colette Sirat, Sara Klein-Braslavy and 
Olga Weijers (Paris: J. Vrin, 2003), 291–317; esp. 292–295. 
82  The only monograph highlighting correctly the significance of Ibn Ezra’s influence on 
post-Maimonidean Jewish philosophy is Dov Schwartz’s Yashan be-qanqan hadash: 
Mishnato ha-iyyunit shel ha-hug ha-neoplatoni be-filosofia ha-yehudit be-mea ha-14 (The 
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Institute and Ben-Zvi Institute, 1996). See also my “Ibn Ezra, a Maimonidean Authority: 
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